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Introduction 
 
“Telecommunications”, writes Barney Warf (1998, 225), “is one of the few 
topics in geography that richly illustrates the plasticity of space, the ways it 
can be stretched, deformed, or compressed according to changing economic 
and political imperatives”. The growing  centrality of key large urban regions, 
or ʻglobal citiesʼ,  to the economic, social, political and cultural dynamics of the 
world (for a review, see Knox and Taylor, 1995) presents a particularly potent 
example of the reconfiguration of space through   telecommunications. In such 
cities, the most sophisticated, diverse and capable electronic infrastructures 
ever seen are being mobilised to compress space and time barriers in a 
veritable frenzy of network construction.  
 
Such processes seem likely to maintain the electronic competitive advantages 
of the largest global cities for some time to come. But the ʻwiringʼ of cities with 
the latest optic fibre networks is also extremely uneven. It is characterised by 
a dynamic of dualisation. On the one hand, seamless and powerful global-
local connections are being constructed within and between highly-valued 
spaces, based on the physical construction of tailored networks to the 
doorsteps of institutions. On the other, intervening spaces -- even those which 
may geographically be cheek-by-jowel with the favoured zones within the 
same city -- seem, at the same time, to be largely ignored by 
telecommunications investment plans. Such spaces threaten to emerge    as  
ʻNetwork ghettosʼ (Thrift, 1995), places of low telecommunications access and 
social disadvantage. As with many contemporary urban trends, then, uneven 
global interconnection via advanced telecommunications becomes subtly 
combined with local disconnection in the production of urban space (see Amin 
and Graham, 1998). 
 
Opportunities to use new electronic technologies to extend oneʼs social and 
economic actions across space are thus being configured highly unevenly 
within and between the material geographies of contemporary cities. In fact, 
the detailed patterns of telecommunications investment in global cities  seem 
to physically embody the logic of what Castells (1996) terms the Network 
Society.  He writes that: 
"The global economy will expand in the 21st century, using substantial 
increases in the power of telecommunications and information processing. It 
will penetrate all countries, all territories, all cultures, all communication flows, 
and all financial networks, relentlessly scanning the planet for new 
opportunities of profit-making. But it will do so selectively, linking valuable 
segments and discarding used up, or irrelevant, locales and people. The 
territorial unevenness of production will result in an extraordinary geography 
differential value making that will sharply contrast countries, regions, and 
metropolitan areas. Valuable locales and people will be found everywhere, 
even in Sub Saharan Africa. But switched off territories and people will also be 
found everywhere, albeit in different proportions. The planet is being 
segmented into clearly distinct spaces, defined by different time regimes"  
Manuel Castells (1997, 21). 
 The contexts for such transformations are now clearly established.  Global 
cities research, in particular,  has  detailed at length  how an interconnected 
network of such cities has recently grown to attain  extraordinary status. Such 
research has demonstrated how such cities are necessary to ʻhold downʼ the  
globalising economic, societal and cultural system. Such cities bring together 
and interweave (in various combinations) the greatest, multidimensional 
concentrations of control, finance, service, cultural, institutional, social, 
informational, and infrastructural industries in the world, in various 
configurations  (Sassen, 1991;1994). All aspects of the development and 
functioning of global cities are increasingly reliant on advanced 
telecommunications networks and services ; such cities concentrate the most 
communications-intensive elements of all economic sectors and transnational 
activities within small portions of geographic space (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997, 
Corbridge et al, 1994).  It is no surprise, therefore,  that there is growing 
evidence that such city-regions heavily dominate investment in, and use of, 
such technologies (Graham and Marvin, 1996).  
 
Rather than simply eroding the territorial governance of modern nation states,  
however, globalization seems to be supporting the re-scaling of institutional, 
regulatory and territorial governance (Brenner, 1998a). By the mid 1980s, all 
Western national states had "substantially re-scaled their internal institutional 
hierarchies in order to play increasingly entrepreneurial roles in producing 
geographic infrastructures for  a new round of capitalist accumulation". In the 
infrastructural arena, this meant a widespread shift to privatising, 
liberalisation, opening up public infrastructure to private investment, and 
allowing increasing freedom for private capital to develop limited, customised 
infrastructures in specific spaces, without worrying about the need to cross-
subsidise networks in less favoured zones.  
 
Thus, public, national, telecommunications regimes that were ostensibly about 
throwing electronic networks universally across national space-economies are 
being materially and institutionally  ʻsplinteredʼ (Graham and Marvin, 1999). In 
their place, national, regional and local states are  developing ʻglocalʼ 
strategies aimed at ensuring that global cities are equipped with the assets 
and electronic  infrastructures that will further support the development of 
global centrality. Efforts here centre on developing connective, customised, 
infrastructures linking the hearts of global cities with planetary networks 
through other global cities. Brenner (1998a, 476) calls these new approaches 
to infrastructural development 'glocal' scalar fixes. To him, they differ totally 
from the styles of infrastructure development that characterised the latter 
stages of the modern ideal. In stark contrast to the Fordist-Keynesian project 
of "homogenising spatial practices on a national scale", he writes, "a key 
result of these processes of state re-scaling has been to intensify capital's 
uneven geographical development" (Brenner, 1998, 476). 
 
As authors like Kellerman (1996) and Warf (1989, 1995) have shown, not only 
do the diversifying electronic infrastructures that girdle the planet have  
specific geographies and spatialities, but global city-regions dominate these 
geographies and spatialities. The current global shift towards liberalised, 
privatised and internationalised telecommunications regimes seems to be 
accentuating the centrality of global cities  to telecommunications investment 
patterns. The national planning of monopolistic telecommunications grids, 
characteristic of Keynesian and developmental states,  was geared, at least to 
some extent, towards discursively and relationally binding  national space 
economies. In the developed world, for example, policies were aimed at the 
universal geographical ʻroll outʼ of  national telephone grids, supported by 
cross-subsidies between profitable and non-profitable routes. This national-
territorial model  is  now giving way to a global process of market-driven 
competition. In global cities, complex, superimposed telecommunications 
networks of many private firms now jostle for the attention of the spaces of 
maximum communications demand. They connect directly with transoceanic 
optic fibres and satellite connections, to offer seamless local-global 
connections in ways that seem to mirror the ʻhubʼ and ʻspokeʼ patterns of 
global interurban airline networks (Smith and Timberlake, 1995).. 
 
But many research challenges remain to be faced before we can satisfactorily 
understand the complex interlinkages between telecommunications grids, 
global cities, and planetary urban networks.   One, in particular, is the focus of 
the current chapter. Here,  my aim is to explore the linkages between the 
growth of a planetary network of global financial, corporate and media 
capitals, and the emerging global and urban information infrastructures that 
interlink, and underpin,  such centres.   
 
As Peter Taylor (1997) suggests, relational connections between world cities 
remain poorly understood. Certainly, very little is known about how the global 
ʻwiringʼ of the planet with a new generation of optic fibre grids interconnects 
with the development of intense concentrations of new communications 
infrastructures within global cities. Through a ʻrelationalʼ perspective (see 
Amin and Graham, 1997, 1998), I aim here to develop such an understanding 
by attempting to address intra-urban,  inter-urban  and transplanetary optic 
fibre connections (and disconnections) in parallel. I would argue that such an 
approach is necessary given the logics inherent within the Network Society, 
which  force us to collapse conventional hierarchical notions of scale -- 
ʻbuildingʼ, ʻdistrictʼ, ʻcityʼ, ʻnationʼ, ʻcontinentʼ, or  ʻplanetʼ. As a result, it is 
difficult  to be a specialist on urban landscapes, intraurban shifts or urban 
systems in separation.  For discussions of restructuring within  cities 
increasingly must address the changing relations between  them, whilst also 
being cognizant of the importance of these changing relations within broader  
dynamics of geopolitics and geoeconomics.   
 
For example, through the logics  of the Network Society, global relational 
connections can, in certain circumstances,  become much more intense than 
local ones. They can, in fact, be combined with very powerful local 
disconnections. . People, machines, institutions, buildings and urban districts 
can become intensively woven together across international space through  
the mediating power of local-global infrastructure networks.  But such spaces 
can, at the same time,  cease to articulate in any meaningful way with their 
local hinterlands or districts, backed up by processes of  urban restructuring, 
the widespread ʻfortressʼ impulse, architectural and urban design strategies,  
police practices  etc. (see Boyer, 1996). As a result,  traditional notions that 
cities, regions and nations have any necessary coherence as territorial 
ʻcontainersʼ  become extremely problematic.  
 
The chapter has five parts. First, I set the context by briefly exploring the  
complex relations between  urban centrality, global cities, and 
telecommunications investment and use. Second,  I look in detail at  how 
global financial, media and corporate capitals are assuming dominant 
positions within global trends towards telecommunications liberalisation and 
explore how such investment might be understood to relate to the 
ʻcompetitivenessʼ of global cities. The third section focuses on the urban 
scale, addressing the case of London. Here I explore in particular  how 
telecommunications liberalisation in the UK has bolstered the competitive 
position of  London as a global city.  The  fourth part of the chapter then 
analyses in detail how global cities are structuring massive current 
investments in  intraurban global optic fibre grids using the 
telecommunications firm WorldCom  as a case study. Finally, I look at the 
global, interurban scale, looking at some examples of new global optic fibre 
grids, which are tieing intraurban optic fibre networks together,  into networks 
which directly parallel  the emerging system of global cities across the planet. 
 
Global Cities: The Social Production of Landscapes  
of Multiple Relational Centrality 
 
It is now clear that global cities grow by cumulatively concentrating  the key 
assets  which corporate headquarters, high-level service industries, global 
financial service industries, national and supranational governance 
institutions, and international cultural industries rely on, within a volatile, 
globalising, operating environment (Markusen,  and Gwiasda, 1994). The 
growing  extent  of globally  ʻstretchedʼ corporate, financial and media webs, 
mediated by telecommunications, computer, and transport networks, seems 
to support a parallel need for  the social production and management of 
places of intense centrality. This is especially so when one adds the volatilities 
thrown up by global shifts toward financial globalisation, economic 
liberalisation, and the opening up of regional blocks to ʻfreeʼ trade.  As 
Michelson and Wheeler suggest, “in times of great uncertainty, select cities 
acquire strategic importance as command centres and as centralized 
producers of the highest order economic information (Michelson and Wheeler, 
1994; 88). To use Boden and Molotchʼs (1994) terminology, the complex 
mediation of economic activity in extremely volatile contexts necessitates high 
levels of “face-to-face co-present interaction” within the high-level managerial 
and control  functions that concentrate in global cities. Particular, grounded, 
and place-based social relations become central to the economic survival of 
high level corporate, media and financial organisations.  
 
Such arguments have important implications for the way we view cities and 
their development within the context of globalisation. To Michael Storper 
(1997, 222), for example, “the nature of the contemporary city is as a local or 
regional ʻsocio-economyʼ, whose very usefulness to the forces of global 
capitalism is precisely as an assembly of specific, differentiated, and localized 
relations”. Such relations are mediated by complex and subtle combinations of 
place-based, face-to-face meetings, and tele-mediated exchange, both at the 
intra and interurban scales. Most importantly, there is not a simple substitution 
of the latter for the former, as so often suggested in ʻinformation ageʼ business 
rhetoric (Graham, 1997). Nigel Thrift (1996), for example,  has recently argued 
that, in London at least, telecommunications technologies may actually 
increase  the demand for  on-going, face-to-face interaction in global financial 
service firms, as the information ʻglutʼ that is associated with them requires 
ever-more continuous, reflexive effort at  interpretation, merely  to make sense 
of it all. Jean Gottmann, one of the pioneers of studying the links between 
cites,  communications, and centrality,  powerfully captures the subtle inter-
relations between them: 
“in the modern world, with its expanding and multiplying networks of relations 
and a snowballing mass of bits of information produced and exchanged along 
these networks, the information services are fast becoming an essential 
component, indeed a cornerstone, of transactional decision making and of 
urban centrality” (Gottmann, 1990; 197).  
 
The Communicational Fabric of Global Cities: Control, Coordination, 
Reflexivity 
 
The economic, social and cultural dynamics of global cities thus rely in 
essence on the control, coordination, processing and movement of 
information, knowledge and ʻsymbolicʼ goods and services (advertising, 
marketing, design, consultancy, finance, media, music etc) (Lash and Urry, 
1994). Within a ʻpost Fordistʼ context of vertical disintegration, niche 
marketing, precise logistical coordination, internationalisation, pervasive 
computerisation, and the powerful growth of symbolic exchange,  all such 
activities are generating booming demands for voice, computer and image 
communications of all types (Warf, 1998). Above all, such conditions are 
supporting an enormous growth in economic reflexivity  placing a premium on 
both the specific socio-economies offered by particular global cities, and 
intensifying, electronically mediated connections between them. As Storper 
(1997, 222) continues: 
 
“important and distinctive dimensions of this reflexivity, in both production and 
consumption, in manufacturing as well as in services, take place in cities; they 
are dependent on the concrete relations between persons and organizations 
that are found in cities; and they are coordinated by conventions that have 
specifically urban dimensions and in addition are different from one city to 
another. Specifically, cities are the privileged sites for the parts of 
manufacturing and service activity where reflexivity is carried out” 
 
The reflexive nature of global city functions thus demands complex, on-going, 
social relations based on trust and reciprocity. These are supported by both 
intense mobility and sophisticated telemediated exchange. In a nutshell, such 
dynamics help explain why perhaps the two most dominant social trends in 
the world today are an unprecedented urbanisation and a growing reliance on 
telecommunications-based relations. Tony Fitzpatrick (1997, 6), the Director 
of Ove Arup, believes that : 
“[global] cities reflect the economic realities of the 21st century. Remote 
working from self-sufficient farm steads via the Internet cannot replace the 
powerhouses of personal interaction which drives teamwork and creativity. 
These are the cornerstones of how professional people add value to their 
work. Besides, you cannot look into someoneʼs eyes and see that they are 
trustworthy over the Internet”.  
 
The Dominance by Global Cities of National and   
International Telecommunications Flows  
 
As mediators of all aspects of the reflexive functioning  and development of 
global cities, convergent media, telecommunications and computing grids 
(known  collectively as ʻtelematicsʼ) are thus basic integrating infrastructures 
underpinning the shift towards intensely-interconnected planetary urban 
networks. Interurban telecommunications networks (both transoceanic optic 
fibres and satellites) comprise a vital set of ʻhubsʼ, ʻspokesʼ and ʻtunnel effectsʼ 
linking urban economies together into ʻrealʼ or ʻnear real timeʼ systems of 
interaction which substantially reconfigure the production of both space and 
time barriers within and between them  (De Roo, 1994).  Such technologies 
help integrate distant financial markets, service industries, corporate 
locations, and media industries with virtual instantaneity and rapidly-
increasing sophistication. But they underpin the enormously complex 
communications demands within  global cities, generated by the intense 
clustering of reflexive practices in space.  
 
In short, the most sophisticated and innovative developments of 
telecommunications effectively grow out of  the larger and more 
internationally-oriented cities. Such dynamics mean that the very small  
geographical areas of the main global finance, corporate and media capitals 
dominate the emerging global political economy of telecommunications to a 
degree which is rarely appreciated because of the dominance of national 
figures in available data.  
 
Two sources of data can help give an indication of this dominance. First, we 
can see how the economic sectors that are overwhelmingly located in global 
cities tend to dominate international telecommunications flows as a whole. For 
example, over 80% of international data flows are taken up by the 
communications, information flows and transactions in the financial services 
sector (Sussman, 1997; 38). Over 50% of all long distance telephone calls in 
the USA are taken up by only 5% of phone customers, largely Transnational 
Corporations whose control functions still cluster in the ʻglobalʼ metropolitan 
areas of the nation.  
 
Second, there is a small amount of available data on the dominance of 
national telecommunications patterns by particular global cities. A recent 
survey by the Yankee group and Communications Week International (Finnie, 
1998), for example, found that around 55% of all international private 
telecommunications circuits that terminate in the UK do so within London. And 
about three-quarters of all advanced data traffic generated in France comes 
from within the Paris region (see Finnie, 1998).  
 
 
Telecommunications and the Geographies of Intraurban Restructuring 
 Beyond this general picture, however, we still know  little about the fine-
grained relationships between telecommunications and the growth, dynamics 
and development of the many sectors that combine to drive the development 
of global cities.  Equally, we know little about the ways in which new 
telecommunications technologies are enrolled into processes of restructuring 
within the geographical landscapes of global cities. How, for example, are 
telecommunications infrastructures and applications  increasingly  bound up in 
the production and restructuring of built environments, with the proliferation of 
ʻintelligent buildingsʼ, ʻsmartʼ office complexes, ʻtele villagesʼ, and  ʻsmartʼ 
highways and infrastructure networks (what  William Mitchell (1995) calls 
ʻrecombinant architectureʼ ) ?. 
 
Noticeable trends have been identified towards the decentralisation and ʻback 
officingʼ of routine services (see OTA, 1995; Graham, 1997, Richardson, 
1994), towards urban suburbs, peripheral, smaller cities,  sometimes even 
ʻperipheralʼ global locations (such as Bangalore, the Caribbean, Jamaica, the 
Northern Phillipines etc.)  (see Sussman and Lent, 1998).   But  their intrinsic 
reflexivity means that there are limits on how far the decentralisation of 
higher-level services can currently go.  Instead, in the cores of global cities, a 
physical restructuring process has recently been observed, caused by the 
needs for new corporate financial architectures with large dealer floors, that 
can accommodate modern electronic dealing systems and 
technologies.These do not simply decentralise to the periphery of cities or 
further afield, to rely purely on electronic interaction ; rather, such processes 
seem to fashion complex new intra-urban geographies of service location.  
Longcore and Rees (1996) recently showed that the larger ʻfloorplateʼ 
demanded by financial service firms in New York may “offset the perceived 
need for face-to-face contact” (p 354) and lead them to shift out from Wall 
Street to a ʻdoughnutʼ ring around the edge of Manhattan.    
 
The Metropolitan Dominance of Non-Corporate Telecommunications 
 
It is important to stress that global cities dominate much broader realms of 
telecommunications activity than those usually addressed in ʻglobal citiesʼ 
literature : financial services, corporate finance and trading. Such is their 
concentration of demands for information, communications and transaction, 
and such is their propensity for broad-scale technological innovation and 
application, that global cities also dominate  phone, mobile phone, media 
communications, and Internet use outside  the corporate and financial 
sectors.  
 
Manhattan, for example, has more telephones than all of the 40 nations in 
sub-Saharan Africa put together (Sussman, 1997; 231). It also provides the 
highest concentration of Internet activity anywhere on Earth, as the Internet  
and its ʻspiralling massʼ of information, communication, transactions, and 
specialised media flows, weaves into support every aspect of the functioning 
of the City.  
 
Manhatten is also  home to a booming set of industrial sectors as New Yorkʼs 
SoHo and Tribeca neighbourhoods emerges as a dominant global provider of 
Internet and multimedia skills, design and  high value-added content of all 
sorts. As in San Franciscoʼs so-called “Multimedia Gulch” district, several 
downtown urban neighbourhoods have been refurbished and gentrified to 
sustain the clustering demands of interlocking micro, small and medium sized 
firms in digital design, advertising, publishing, fashion, music, multimedia, 
computing and communications. Over 2 200 firms now provide over 56,  000 
jobs in these sectors, up 105 per cent since between 1996 and 1998 
(Rothstein, 1998). Here, as with global financial services sectors, the need for 
on-going face-to-face contact, to sustain continuous innovation and reflexivity, 
is closely combined with exceptionally high use of advanced 
telecommunications, to link relationally and continuously with the rest of the 
planet.  
 
As a result,  Manhattan now has twice the ʻdomain densityʼ (i.e. concentration 
of Internet hosts) of the next most ʻinternet-richʼ US city - San Francisco -  and 
six times the US average (Moss and Townshend, 1997). In fact, the 
metropolitan dominance of the Internet is the USA is actually growing  rather 
than  declining, despite its association with rural ʻelectronic cottagesʼ. The top 
15 metropolitan core regions in the US in Internet domains accounted for just 
4.3 % of national population in 1996. But they contained 12.6% of the US total 
in April 1994 and by 1996 this had risen to  almost 20%, as the Internet 
became a massly diffused and corporately rich system . As  Moss and 
Townsend suggest (1997), “the highly disproportionate share of Internet 
growth in these cities demonstrates that Internet growth is not weakening the 
role of information-intensive cities. In fact, the activities of information-
producing cities have been driving the growth of the Internet  in the last three 
years” (emphasis added).  
 
Telecommunications Liberalisation, Global Cities,  
and Urban ʻCompetitivenessʼ 
 
It is  altogether not surprisingly, given the above discussion,  that global cities 
are having a critical influence in shaping  emerging global geographies and 
geometries of telecommunications infrastructure development. Central 
Business Districts (CBDs) districts within global cities, in particular, play a 
predominant role within extremely  fast-moving communications landscapes. 
They provide leading foci of  rapid technological change,  liberalised service 
provision, and highly concentrated patterns of investment in new 
telecommunications infrastructures, from multiple competing providers 
(Graham and Marvin, 1996). Global financial service industries, in particular, 
are especially important in driving telecommunications liberalisation. With 
telecom costs taking up around 8% of expenditure on goods and services in 
global financial firms, world class telecommunications infrastructure, and a 
ʻbusiness friendly,ʼ fully-liberalised regulatory environment, are thus becoming 
key assets in the competitive race between global cities to lure in financial and 
corporate operations and their telecommunications hubs (Moss, 1992).   
 
For Transnational Companies of all kinds, liberalised telecommunications 
markets  allow the benefits of competition to be maximised. The spread of 
liberalisation also minimises the transaction, negotiation and interconnection 
costs that stem from constructing global networks within the diverse 
regulatory and cultural contexts of multiple PTTs across the globe. Global 
telecoms liberalisation is thus critical given the strategic centrality of private 
telecommunications networks to the functioning of all TNCs, financial and 
media firms. The emerging  global, private regime allows lucrative corporate 
and financial market segments to benefit from intense, customised, and often 
very localised competition in  high level telecommunications infrastructure and 
services, when this was impossible through old-style PTTs.  
 
In short, for leading finance, transnational and media  firms, sophisticated 
“telecommunications are becoming central to business success or failure” 
(Finnie, 1998). Such firms demand an increasingly complex and seamless 
package of broadband connections and services,  within and between the 
global cities where they operate. Such demands include leased lines, so-
called ʻvirtual private networksʼ connecting their sites in a seamless manner, 
private optic fibre connections, dedicated satellite circuits, video conferencing, 
and, increasingly, highly capable mobile and wireless services.  
 
In addition, such powerful corporate, financial and media users are pressing 
hard to enjoy the fruits of competition between multiple network providers in 
global cities. Such competition tends to increase discounts, improve efficiency 
and innovation, and, above, all reduce risks of network failure by increasing 
network ʻresilienceʼ). Mean while, however, peripheral regions and 
marginalised social groups often actually lose out and fail to reap the benefits 
of competition, as they are left with the rump of old PTT infrastructures, 
relatively high prices, and poor levels of reliability and innovation. Highly 
uneven microgeographies of ʻsplinteredʼ telecommunications development 
thus replace the relatively integrated and homogenous networks developed by 
national telephone monopolies (Graham and Marvin, 1999). 
 
Global Cities and International  Telecommunications Liberalisation 
 
As a result of such liberalising pressures, a global wave of liberalisation 
and/or privatisation is transforming  national telecommunications regimes. The 
key lobbying pressures driving this shift derive from TNCs, the WTO and G7, 
telecommunication industries and, especially,  the corporate, financial  and 
media service industries that  concentrate in global cities (Graham and 
Marvin, 1996).  In the context of the recent World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
agreement to move towards a global liberalised telecommunications market, 
and with most regions of the globe now instigating Regional Trading Block 
agreements (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, Mercosur etc.) based on removing national 
barriers to telecoms competition, a profound reorganisation of the global 
telecommunications industry is taking place.  
 
The initial example of metropolitan network competition (or ʻbypassʼ as it was 
then called)  was set by New York in the 1980s. Then, a whole new 
competitive urban telecommunications infrastructure was developed in the 
City by the teleport company and Port Authority (Warf, 1989). As the 
pressures of the global neo-liberal orthodoxy in telecommunications have 
grown,  even the most resistant nation states (such as France, Germany, 
Singapore and Malaysia) are now succumbing to  calls for national PTT 
(Postal, Telegraph and Telephone) monopolies to be withdrawn, to be 
replaced by uneven, multiple, telecoms infrastructures which inevitably 
articulate centrally around  large metropolitan markets.  
 
In the shift to a seemlessly-interconnected global telecoms industry, national 
Postal, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT), monopolies are  thus being rapidly  
privatised and/or liberalised right across the globe. Private telecom firms are 
aggressively ʻuprootingʼ to make acquisitions, strategic alliances and mergers 
with other firms, in a global struggle to build truly planetary 
telecommunications service firms, geared towards meeting the precise needs 
of TNCs and financial firms within the whole planetary network of global cities, 
on a ʻone stop, one contractʼ basis (Finnie, 1998).  
 
For example, in an effort to position themselves for this ʻone stopʼ corporate 
market, BT and  AT&T, both trying to reposition themselves from national to 
global players, have recently announced a global alliance.  AT&T have also 
merged with the huge US cable firm Tele-Communications company to 
improve their position within home US markets.   The Swedish, Swiss, 
Spanish and Dutch PTTs, meanwhile, have their ʻGlobal Oneʼ umbrella.  
France Telecom and Deutsch Telekom have an alliance with the US 
international operator Sprint. As we shall see later in the chapter, new, small, 
specialised telecom firms like WorldCom/MFS and COLT and growing, using 
their flexibility and responsiveness to target only the most profitable business 
centres for network construction. A myriad of other firms are offering services 
based on reselling network capacity leased in bulk from other firmsʼ 
telecommunications networks. Finally,  there is a process of alliance formation 
between telecoms, media and cable firms. All are jostling to position 
themselves favourably for corporate and domestic markets, especially in the 
information-rich global city-regions, for the future where many envisage a 
globally liberalised telecommunications environment with perhaps four or five 
giant, truly global, multimedia, conglomerates. 
 
The position of global cities is therefore being substantially reinforced by the 
shift from national telecommunications monopolies (PTTs) to a globalised, 
liberalised communications marketplace. As cross-subsidies between rich and 
poor, and core and periphery, spaces  within  nations are removed (with the 
associated notion of universal tariffs),  infrastructure development, innovation 
and service provision now reflects unevenness in communications demand in 
a much more potent way than has been witnessed for the last half century, 
taking on an increasingly-integrated global appearance in the process. Prices 
and tariffs are being unbundled at the national level, revealing stark new 
geographies which compound the advantages of valued spaces within global 
cities as attractive and highly-profitable telecommunications markets, 
dominating telecommunications investment patterns within nation states. .   
 
The Microgeographical Imperatives of ʻLocal Loopʼ Connection 
 
It is paradoxical, however,  that  an industry which endlessly proclaims the 
ʻDeath of Distanceʼ actually remains driven by the old-fashioned geographic 
imperative of using networks to drive physical market access. The greatest 
challenge of these multiplying telecommunications firms in global cities  is  
what is termed the problem of the ʻlast mileʼ : getting satellite installations, 
optic fibre ʻdropsʼ and whole networks through the expensive ʻlocal loopʼ, 
under the roads and pavements of the urban fabric, to the buildings and sites 
of target users. Without the expensive laying of hardware it is not possible to 
enter the market and gain lucrative contracts. Fully 80% of the costs of a 
network are associated with this traditional, ʻmessyʼ business of getting it into 
the ground in highly congested, and contested,  urban areas.  
 
This is why precise infrastructure planning (through the use of sophisticated 
Geographic Information Systems)  is increasingly being used to ensure that 
the minimum investment brings the highest market potential.  It also explains 
why any opportunity is explored to string optic fibres through the older 
networks of ducts and leeways that are literally sunk deep within the 
archaeological  ʻroot systemsʼ of old urban cores. Mercuryʼs fibre grid in 
Londonʼs financial district, for example,  uses the  ducts of a long-forgotten 
19th century hydraulic power network. Other operators thread optic fibres 
along rail, road, canal and other leeways and conduits. Whilst satellite 
infrastructures are obviously more flexible, they are nowhere near as capable 
or secure as physical optic fibre ʻdropsʼ to a building. And they, too, ultimately 
rely on having the hardware in place to deliver services to the right ʻfoot printʼ. 
 
Mapping and Measuring the ʻCompetitivenessʼ of Global Citiesʼ 
Telecommunications Infrastructure 
 
How, then, are all these dynamics coming together to shape the ʻwiringʼ of 
global cities currently ? How can we understand the position of different global 
cities within this apparent  maelstrom of  technical and regulatory change, 
changing firm strategies, and physical network development ? Above all, what 
does ʻcompetitivenessʼ mean in world city electronic infrastructure today ?  
 
A recent survey by the Yankee Group, a UK telecommunications consultancy, 
and Communications Week International, attempted to rank the 
competitiveness of  telecommunications provision in early 1998 in 25 global 
cities encompassing 5% of the worldsʼ population (see Finnie, 1998). Their  
resulting scored rankings (see Figure 1) were based on technical definitions of  
the  pricing of services, the choice of physical infrastructure connections 
available,  and the availability of the most advanced and sophisticated 
connections (for example, ʻdark fibreʼ, which is unconnected to other user and  
very broadband services).  
 
Their results give a revealing portrait of the degree to which intense 
competition is focussing on the small number of global cities which 
concentrate particularly high demand, are located within  the core geo-
economic regions of the world, and are placed within nations that have 
enthusiastically embraced telecommunications liberalisation. The researchers 
concluded that “cities large and small around the globe are integral to the 
fortunes of the worldʼs economy, yet the ʻtelecommunication] infrastructure in 
each can vary greatly. [...] Although the gap between the best and worst of 
infrastructure is narrowing, particularly in the middle ground, it is still very 
wide” (Finnie, 1998, 20).  
 The five US cities included in the sample ranked highest and most 
competitive. New York led the way with nine separate optic fibre 
infrastructures. London was the most ʻcompetitiveʼ city outside the US, with six 
separate optic fibre grids.  Cities that are currently experiencing a proliferation 
of urban fibre infrastructures, following recent liberalisation,  came next 
(Stockholm, Paris, Sydney, Honk Kong, Frankfurt and Amsterdam). The rest 
trailed further behind because of insufficient network competition, relatively 
high tariffs, and a lack of access to the most sophisticated services. Eleven 
out of the twenty five cities only had one optic fibre network, tieing firms into 
sole, monopoly suppliers. Interestingly, though,  the researchers believed that, 
such were the rate of current current shifts towards  global archipelagos of 
competitive global city optic fibre grids, that all global cities “at least five” optic 
fibre grids “in the near future” (Fillion, 1998; 22).  
 
Global cities in the ʻdevelopingʼ world tended to be at the bottom of the table 
because of their  nation statesʼ general reluctance to privatise and/o liberalise 
their telecommunications regimes. Here, the authors portrayed foreign-owned 
telecom infrastructures as the ʻsilver bulletʼ to such citiesʼ lack of 
ʻcompetitivenessʼ, arguing that: 
“the “poorerʼ cities in our survey -- defined as such in terms of GDP per capita 
-- trail far behind, victims by and large of local reluctance to allow competition. 
Of these five “poorer” cities -- Mexico City, Johannesburg, Beijing and Kuala 
Lumpur -- only Mexico City makes a reasonable showing, mainly because it 
has been efficient colonized by foreign owned telecoms operators taking 
advantage of Mexicoʼs liberal regulatory structure. The others still have a  
along way to go before they can join the global elite”  (Finnie, 1998; 22). 
 
Telecommunications Liberalisation and Global City  
Competition : The Case  of London 
 
Continuing our focus on the metropolitan scale for the moment, London 
provides a particularly illuminating case study of the detailed processes 
through which global cities develop multiple, competing telecommunications 
infrastructures. As the above survey suggests, Londonʼs position as the 
preeminent European Global Finance capital has been significantly bolstered 
by the very early, and very radical, liberalisation of UK telecommunications. 
The Corporation of London argue that the UKʼs liberalisation of 
telecommunications since 1981 has contributed directly to London's continued 
competitiveness as a global information capital. “Product innovation and 
service provision in telecommunications”, they write,  “have been directed 
towards the financial services. Competition between telecom providers 
appears to have had a considerable effect on customers. Services have been 
redefined and costs reduced” (Simmons, 1994).  
 
In the mid 1990s, Londonʼs City Research Project analysed Londonʼs 
telecommunications infrastructure in considerable detail. Like the Yankee 
Group/ Communications Week International  survey, they  found it to be 
superior to any other equivalent global city outside the USA (New York, for 
example, was found to have  both lower costs and better service quality than 
London) (Ireland, 1995). Since the UK liberalised its telecommunications in 
1981, over 1000 new telecommunications licenses have been awarded, many 
offering specialised, tailored, services to financial and corporate industries in 
the City, either over new infrastructures or by ʻresaleʼ and ʻleased linesʼ over  
the existing telecom grids of other telecom companies.  The fact that the 
financial services sector accounts for 15% of the UK telecommunications 
market has meant that the City of London has been the prime beneficiary of 
this shift to competition, attracting intense infrastructure investment and 
localised competition from all the main global telecommunications players. 
The overall telecommunications market for London was recently estimated at 
over  £1 300 million, around the same as that for Paris (£1 300 million) and 
over three times that in Frankfurt (£253 million) (COLT communications, web 
site, http://www.colttelecom.com/english/corporate ).  
 
The Proliferation of Dedicated Optic Fibre Grids 
 
The City of London now has six, overlaid, fibre optic grids superimposed 
beneath the ʻSquare Mileʼ and the rest of the main business areas of the City 
(BT, Mercury, City of London Telecommunications (COLT), WorldCom, 
Energis and Sohonet). Roads, canal pathways, old hydraulic power ducts, 
underground railway tubes, sewers and other utility pipes provide the conduits 
for this massive concentration of electronic infrastructure. Increasingly, these 
urban networks link directly into transatlantic and transglobal optic fibre grids, 
maximising the quality and reliability of transglobal connectivity. The direct, 
digital, broadband connections  that are essential for extremely fast and 
increasingly multimedia financial service telematics applications are now 
available at very competitive rates.  The City has also  particularly benefited 
from the ʻrebalancing of tariffsʼ with radical reductions in the costs of 
international calls and leased lines (which are usually substantially discounted 
for bulk users).  
 
Gaining detailed information on the urban geographies of these competing 
infrastructures is not easy (Kellerman, 1994). But details are available of one 
of these six networks, that operated  COLT (City of London 
Telecommunications) (Figure 2). The geographies of the other five are 
unlikely to  vary considerably. Figure 2 thus shows how dedicated fibre 
networks tend to be tightly focused, at least at first, on the central areas with 
the most intensive concentration of communications-intensive activities. In the 
COLT network fibre is laid especially thickly in the City of London financial 
district. A broader grain of network coverage exists in the West End. And an 
extension runs out to the new international business spaces in the Docklands.  
 
Londonʼs Advantages in Other Services 
 
In addition to dedicated fibre networks, London has many  satellite data and 
voice facilities, a comprehensive suite of microwave communications grids, 
and dozens of “reselling” service operators from all over the world, (which 
lease infrastructure capacity from telecom operators for resale, offering 
discounts  and customised service portfolios to corporate and financial firms in 
the City). A  host of value added and consultancy firms  are also concentrated 
in the City, supporting state-of-the-art innovation in financial telecoms service 
and corporate telematics applications (Ireland, 1995).   
 
Whilst this remarkable concentration of localised investment and infrastructure 
can be confusing for customers, it generally  leads to improved service 
quality, lower costs, faster innovation, much improved reliability,  radically 
reduced risks and improved ʻresilienceʼ (a term meaning that the network 
services are much less likely to go ʻdownʼ because multiple routes are 
inherently built in to them -  a critical consideration when even a small 
connection problem can costs millions, even billions, of dollars in lost revenue 
and exchange).  
 
Such advantages have allowed the City of London to emerge as the main 
telecommunications and computer networking hub in Europe, with many 
German firms connecting to the City directly for their global networks to 
access the better networks, tailored services and, most importantly, lower 
priced services (Germany has long resisted telecoms liberalisation and is only 
now offering limited competition in business services and infrastructure).  
 
Dedicated Digital Media Connections to Hollywood: the  ʻSohonetʼ Initiative 
 
But Londonʼs advantages in telecommunications infrastructure  extend into 
cultural and media industries sectors, too. For example, a specialised 
telecommunications network was  constructed in 1997  by a consortium of 
London film companies called ʻSohonetʼ. This system links the tight 
concentration of film and media companies, TV broadcasters, publishers, 
Internet providers, graphic designers and recording studios headquarters in 
Londonʼs Soho and West End district directly to Hollywood film studios via  
seamless transatlantic fibre connections. Sohonet allows on-line film 
transmission, ʻvirtual studiosʼ and editing over intercontinental scales via 
highly capable, digital, broadband connections. The network is seen as a 
critical boost the the broader global ambitions of the UK film and cultural 
industries. Other connections are planned to other global cities, leading to a 
dedicated, global, interurban system in the near future. Thus, once again, it is 
clear that patterns of tight geographical  clustering, relying on intense, on-
going, face-to-face innovation and contact,  linked globally and locally through 
sophisticated telemediated networks, is a feature of many of the industries 
which concentrate in global cities (not just financial services and corporate 
services).  
 
Customising Planetary Archipelagos of Global City  
Networks:   The Case of WorldCom  
 
Another of Londonʼs six optic fibre infrastructures has been developed since 
1994 by  WorldCom/MFS. This network  has  been particularly successful, 
providing a potent reminder of how powerful but geographically highly  
focused infrastructures in global cities can be at articulating large portions of 
the electronic flows of whole nations, even continents. With only 180 
kilometres of fibre constructed within the City, the London WorldCom network 
has already secured fully 20% of the whole of the UKʼs international 
telecommunications traffic  (Finnie 1998), which, in turn, is a good proportion 
of Europeʼs.  
 
The case of WorldCom/MFS, moreover means that our focus can begin to 
move from the metropolitan to the international scale.  In particular, the 
WorldCom case demonstrates how  how certain telecom firms are targeting 
selected networks of world cities across the world as recipients of dedicated 
urban fibre networks. In effect, the company is constructing their own global 
archipeligo of ʻwired citiesʼ and are increasingly investing to link those urban 
networks together across the planet with international optic fibre connections. 
 
In doing this, WorldCom are building on the initial, highly successfully efforts 
of the telecommunications firm MFS, who they took over in 1996. A new 
telecom firm formed  from scratch in 1989,  MFS expanded rapidly, dedicating 
itself entirely to meeting the specialist communications needs of large 
corporate and government players in global cities. It offered private voice, 
and, increasingly, data, video and multimedia circuits and networks, based on 
dedicated fibre rings  which were, in turn, linked into global fibre and satellite 
grids. By September 1996, MFS had laid  3,500 route miles of optic fibre 
directly connecting 11,033 buildings connects and offering a total of  
5,008,909  voice circuits. In the US, according to a study by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in 1997, MFS led all other Competitive 
Access Providers in the four most significant levels of measurement: route 
miles, fibre miles, number of customer buildings served, and  number of 
customer locations.   More customers  chose MFS as their primary carrier to 
access long distance carriers, or to connect various user locations, because it 
was the only company that provided coverage in all seven of the Regional Bell 
Operating Company (RBOC) territories.  
 
In 1996, MFS was taken over by WorldCom,  itself only founded in 1991. The 
new company, WorldCom/MFS,  is now aiming  to construct a dedicated, 
global system of optic fibre networks within and between the major business 
centres of the entire planet, to deliver end-to-end high bandwidth connectivity 
for multinational customers and global Internet providers. Rapid progress is 
being made towards this end. The WorldCom/ MFS London network 
mentioned above is one of  the largest of over 60  city fibre optic 
infrastructures which are being developed across the world by WorldCom, in 
carefully-targeted, financially-strong city-centres (see Figures 3 and 4). 45 of 
these are currently in the USA (see Figure 3). 130 WorldCom city grids are 
eventually  planned - 85 in the US, 40 in Europe,  with the rest in Asia, Latin 
America and the Pacific. Each is carefully targeted onto “information-rich” 
global cities and parts of global cities which have sufficient concentration of 
large corporate or government offices to ensure high levels of international 
revenue relative to miles of network constructed.  
 
WorldCom aims to provide an alternative to the giant alliances like BT and  
AT&T, using  the speed and flexibility that derives from its small size as a 
marketing tool.  It  benefits from recent legislation in the US allowing the sort 
of local loop, “to the door” infrastructure competition,  that  exists in the UK. 
The Company provides one-stop shopping for integrated local and long-
distance services, as well as a wide range of high-quality voice, data and 
other enhanced services and systems specifically designed to meet the 
requirements of business and government customers.   
 
By offering new, direct optic fibre connections to corporate head quarters, 
stock exchanges, producer service firms, media companies, international 
organisations and government agencies, WorldCom is able to offer secure, 
highly cost effective and extremely advanced telecommunications services 
such as: local private lines, special access digital communications services, 
advanced high speed  so-called extremely capable ʻAutonomous Transfer 
Modeʼ based data communications services, and a suite of switched services 
(including virtual private networks,  voice mail, calling card, freefone 800/888 
number services, customised billing and management reports and 
telemanagement     services).     
 
WorldComʼs strategy of completely bypassing the traditional, nationally-
oriented Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), run by the old 
telephone monopolies,   means that these service directly match the  
geographical logic of corporate networks within the overall global city system  
(without facing the burden of serving other less lucrative,  locations)  
WorldComʼs remarkable growth  meant that, even by only servicing only 45 
city centres, by 1997 it was the USAʼs 18th biggest telecoms firm (Sussman, 
1997; 141).    
 
The companyʼs high levels of service, moreover, out performs that of 
traditional phone companies - a factor which is of critical significance to highly 
tele-reliant firms it deals with.  WorldCom plans “Route Diversity” into its optic 
fibre networks - guarding against the enormous damage a single misplaced 
road digger might wreak. Disaster protection is  maintained  by using two 
separate 100% fibre optic paths for traffic between buildings on the WorldCom 
network. WorldComʼs networks currently run at a reliability rating of 99.99% ; 
even when networks do go ʻdownʼ back up links mean that services such as 
electronic share trading are resumed after an unnoticeable  20 milliseconds. 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates that WorldComʼs strategy, in extending beyond the US 
market, is once more  to ʻcherry pickʼ  the most  information-intensive parts of 
the most lucrative global finance capitals for dedicated optic fibre networks. 
WorldCom is aggressively building overseas networks to take advantage of 
the global wave of liberalisations so that its ʻone stopʼ service ore and more 
matches the global geometry of the global city system. Within each targeted 
city networks are carefully planned to cover only the most lucrative, 
concentrated corporate and financial zones. In London, for example, the 180 
km network mentioned above is slightly more extensive than COLTʼs. But it 
still covers only the City of London, the West End and the branch out towards 
and beyond Heathrow airport. Its new Frankfurt and Paris networks - the first 
of their type allowed by the Bonn and Paris governments in previously 
monopolistic telecoms regimes - are similarly directly target optic fibre drops 
onto financial and business districts only (see Figure 4). New WorldCom 
urban networks in Sydney, Hamburg and a range of Latin American cities 
(starting with São Paulo) were announced in 1998. As soon as regulations 
allow, WorldCom have also expressed a desire to build infrastructures in 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and 
Shanghai.  
 
Global Grids of Glass: Interconnecting Urban Fibre Networks  
 
Which brings us to our final scale of analysis : that of planetary 
interconnection and the geopolitics of infrastructure construction across 
oceans and continents.  Of course, dedicated optic fibre grids within  the 
business cores of global cities are of little use without interconnections that 
allow seamless corporate and financial networks to piece together to directly 
match the ʻhubʼ and ʻspokeʼ geographies of international urban systems 
themselves. To this end, WorldCom and the many other internationalising 
telecommunications companies are currently expending huge resources 
within massive consortia, laying  the satellite and optic fibre infrastructures 
necessary to string the planetʼs urban regions into a single, highly-
interconnected communicational landscape. Such efforts are especially 
focussing on the high-demand corridors linking the geostrategic, metropolitan 
zones of the three dominant global economic blocks : North America, Europe 
and East and South Eastern Asia. Wiring North America and the North 
Atlantic  is proceeding at a particularly rapid pace, with  AT&T, Sprint, 
WorldCom, and US Regional ʻBaby Bellsʼ fighting it out with newcomers like 
Quest to provide the ʻpipesʼ that will keep up with demand, especially from the 
Internet. Other lesser infrastructures are also being layed, designed to link 
Southern metropolitan regions in Australia, South Africa and Brazil into the 
global constellation of inter-urban information infrastructures.  
 
Currently, transoceanic and transterrestrial optic fibre and satellite capacities 
concentrate overwhelmingly on linking North America  across the North 
Atlantic to Europe and across the North Pacific to  Japan, reflecting the 
geopolitical hegemony of these three regions in the late 20th century (Warf, 
1995). The first transoceanic fibre networks, developed since 1988 across the 
Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, with  AT&T playing a leading role, tended 
to stop at the shorelines, leaving terrestrial networks to connect to each 
nationʼs markets (see Warf, 1998). Increasingly, however, transoceanic fibre 
networks are being built explicitly to link metropolitan cores, in response to 
their centrality as generators of traffic and centres of investment.  
 
Once again, WorldCom, in its efforts to connect together its metropolitan 
infrastructures, is leading this process. As well as constructing a transatlantic 
fibre network know as Gemini between the centres of New York and London, 
WorldCom are building their own pan-European ʻUlyssesʼ network linking its 
city grids in Paris, London, Amsterdam, Brussels, and major UK business 
cities beyond London. Elsewhere in the world, too, they are exploring the 
construction of transnational and transoceanic fibre networks to connect  their  
globalising archipelago of dedicated  city networks.  The strengthened 
importance of direct city-to-city connection is not lost on telecommunications 
commentators. As Finnie (1998) argues: 
“it should be no surprises [...] that when London-based Cable and Wireless 
plc. and WorldCom laid the Gemini transatlantic cable -- which came into 
service in March 1998 -- they ran the cable directly into London and New 
York, implicitly taking into account the fact that a high proportion of 
international traffic originates in cities. All previous cables terminated at the 
shoreline” (Finnie 1998, 20) 
 
At the strategic, global scale, globalisation, and the rapid growth of Newly 
Industrial Countries, means that  much effort is being spent  ʻfilling in gapsʼ in 
the global patterns of optic fibre interconnection, particularly between Europe 
and Asia. One project, for example, known as ʻFLAGʼ (or ʻFibre Optic Link 
Around the Globeʼ) will provide a new ultra high-capacity (120 000 
simultaneous phone calls) telecoms grid over 28,000 km from London to 
Japan, via many previously poorly-connected metropolitan regions and nation 
states. The route first  goes by sea from England via the Bay of Biscay and 
Mediterranean to Alexandria and Cairo. Then it crosses Suez and Saudi 
Arabia overland to Dubai, crosses the Indian Ocean to  Bombay and Penang 
and Kuala Lumpur, traverses the Malay peninsular to  Bangkok,   finally going 
by sea again to Hong Kong Shanghai, and Japan. Nynex, the New York 
phone company, is organising the project with support from a huge range of 
private investors. FLAG will also connect with the 12,000 km Pacific Cable 
Network linking Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Honk Kong, the Phillipines, 
Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia (Warf, 1998, 260.  
 
Other similar projects are proliferating across the globe. A 30,000 km China-
US Cable network, the first direct linkage between the two nations, was 
announced by a  14 firm consortium in December 1997. Other transoceanic 
cables are also being constructed  in the Caribbean (the ʻEastern Caribbean 
Fibre Systemʼ), between Florida and the Mediterranean urban system ; by  
AT&T around the African continent (offering a  high level of security whilst 
providing  fibre drops to all the main cities on the African coast) ;  and by 
Telefónica of Spain from the USA and Europe to the main metropolitan 
regions of Latin America (Fortaleza, Rio, São Paulo, Buenos Aires), again 
with the involvement of WorldCom. But the largest project of them , all, 
ʻProject Oxygenʼ, was announced in 1998 : a $15 billion global network, built 
by 73 multinational telecommunications firms, linking the largest urban 
regions in 171 countries by 2003, via over 300,000 km of optic fibre cable. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has sought to extend our empirical and conceptual 
understanding of the ways in which global cities, and global city networks, are 
related to  both intraurban and interurban information infrastructures. It has 
emerged that current advances in telecommunications are a set of  
phenomena which are  overwhelmingly driven by large, internationally-
oriented, ʻglobalʼ metropolitan regions.  The activities, functions and urban 
dynamics which become concentrated in global city-regions rely intensely on 
the facilitating attributes of advanced telecommunications for supporting 
relational complexity, distantiated links, and  snowballing interactions, both 
within and between cities. Such ʻtele-relianceʼ is particularly high in 
internationally-oriented industries whose ʻproductsʼ and ʻservicesʼ are little 
more than telemediated flows of exchange, information, communication and 
transaction, backed up also by intense face-to-face contact and supporting 
electronic coordination.   
 
It should be no surprise, then, that, in an increasingly demand-driven media 
and communications landscape, global cities  should dominated investment 
in, and use of, advanced telecommunications infrastructures and services to 
the extent that they do. Global cities are the main focus of the highly uneven 
emerging geographies of network competition. They dominate all aspects of 
telecommunications innovation, from dedicated, proprietary, corporate 
networks to electronic commerce and transactions,  to advanced phone 
services and consumption and and dedicated digital media networks, to the 
production  of Internet services. 
 
As we have seen, such cities are now developing their own superimposed 
and customised fibre networks, linked together seemlessly across the planet 
into a global cities communicational fabric, whilst often (at least in the initial 
stages of development) separating them off from traditional notions of 
hinterland, urban and regional interdependence, and national infrastructural 
sovereignty.  The WorldCom city networks explored above, for example, 
demonstrate that the emerging urban communicational landscape is rapidly 
becoming dominated by tailored, customised infrastructures. Through these, 
dominant corporate, media and financial players can maintain and extend 
their powers over space, time and people. Such infrastructures are carefully 
localised to physically include only the users and territory necessary to drive 
profits and connect global corporate, financial and media clusters together.  
 
But, in so doing, such networks seem likely to further urban socio-spatial 
polarisation by carefully by-passing non-lucrative spaces within the city. They 
are, in other words, physical, infrastructural embodiments of the splintering 
and fracturing of urban space described within Castells' (1996, 366) recent 
Network Society  thesis where “space organizes time”. The combination of 
intra and inter-urban fibre networks thus  materially support the dynamic and 
highly uneven production of space-times of intense global connectivity, made 
up of linked assemblies of high level corporate, financial and media clusters, 
and their associated socio-economic elites, within the spaces of global cities.  
 
Finally,  it seems inevitable that the customised combinations of intra and inter 
urban fibre networks analysed in this chapter will also drive uneven 
development at the national level. They will excluding non-dominant parts of 
national urban systems from the competitive advantages that stem from 
tailored, customised urban information infrastructures. Such  infrastructures 
lay to rest any prevailing assumptions that there   necessarily remains any 
meaningful connection between the sovereignty of nation states as territorial 
ʻcontainersʼ (Taylor, 1995), and patterns of  infrastructural development, 
especially for telecommunications infrastructures. The  traditional ʻmodernʼ 
notion that nationhood is partly defined by the ability to roll-out universally 
accessible infrastructural grids to ʻbindʼ the national space is completely 
destroyed by the new infrastructural logic (Elkin, 1995).  
 
Instead, the logic of the emerging electronic infrastructure is to directly follow 
global city networks, through direct global-local interconnection,  which 
inevitably punctures and unbundles any notion of national infrastructural 
sovereignty. As Castells (1996, 380) suggests, “inside each country, the 
networking architecture reproduces itself into regional and local centers, so 
that the whole system becomes interconnected at a global level. Territories 
surrounding these nodes play an increasingly subordinate function 
(sometimes becoming irrelevant or even dysfunctional)”. Elsewhere I have 
called this subtle combination of reflexive socio-economies of ʻclustersʼ within 
global cities, with transplanetary telecommunications networks, ʻrelational 
assembliesʼ (Graham, 1998). 
 
Thus, whilst global cities are emerging as strategic locations articulating  the 
geostrategic ʻroll outʼ of planetary optic fibre grids, they seem likely to 
generate very high degrees of uneven development internally, and ever-more 
problematic relations with their traditional hinterlands and peripheries.  Once 
relatively cohesive, homogenous, and equalising infrastructure grids at the 
national level are thus clearly ʻsplinteringʼ into tailored, customised and global-
local grids, designed to meet the needs of hegemonic economic and social 
actors (Graham and Marvin, 1999).    
 
The competitive, customised, and dedicated fibre networks which result 
clearly contribute towards the economic competitiveness of global cities. But 
we must be careful not to over-stress such advantages.   Such infrastructures 
are necessary but not sufficient to sustain the economic competitiveness of 
global cities (see Gillespie and Williams, 1988) ; they do not drive 
development in some deterministic cause-and-effect way. Customised fibre 
grids are but one small necessary factor within a complex cumulative process 
that drives the competitive advantage of particular urban ʻsocio-economiesʼ in 
the contemporary world, within the context of growing economic, social and 
cultural reflexivity.  
 
Advantages deriving from multiple fibre networks, moreover,  also seem likely 
to diminish over time,  as such assets diffuse to a broader range of global 
cities, across all the major economic regions of the world. In addition, 
advances in broadband satellite services, such as the five or six global 
broadband satellite systems now planned or under development, may also 
serve to blunt the distinctive telecommunications advantages of favoured 
global cities Such is the lucrative pull of the markets in such cities, however,  
that they always seem likely to be ʻahead of the gameʼ, cutting the leading 
edge of advanced telecommunications in terms of capacity, price, reliability 
and sophistication in ways required by the most communications-intensive 
activities of the planet. 
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